This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that managers are motivated in part by personal animosityor respect-towards their rivals. A reciprocal manager responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (positive reciprocity). We find that if fairness payoffs are small by comparison with monetary payoffs, then collusive action profiles (prices or quantities) are easier to sustain when firms have reciprocal managers. Thus, fairness concerns among firms with reciprocal managers can have adverse welfare consequences for consumers. JEL Classification Numbers: D43, D63, L13, L21.
Introduction
The assumption that individuals behave as if maximizing their material payoffs, despite its central role in economic analysis, is at odds with a large body of evidence from psychology and from experimental economics. Economic agents often pursue objectives other than actual payoff maximization. Many observed departures from material payoff maximizing behavior arise through actions that favor fairness or reciprocity.
Fairness and reciprocity have been shown to explain behavior in bargaining games and in trust games. For example, in ultimatum games offers are usually much more generous than predicted by equilibrium and low offers are often rejected. These offers are consistent with an equilibrium in which proposers make offers knowing that responders may reject allocations that appear unfair.
The impact of fairness and reciprocity on market outcomes is an active area of research. Rabin (1993) and Rotemberg (forthcoming) show that fairness concerns by the part of consumers can improve consumer welfare. For example, Rabin (1993) finds that a monopolist ought to set price lower than "the monopoly price" if consumers have concerns about fairness.
In this paper we ask whether reciprocity may help to sustain collusive behavior. For instance, if a collusive agreement is seen by the parties as a fair outcome, then if one party reneges on the agreement and undercuts the price (or boosts its output), its rivals may be offended and hence punish the deviator aggressively (even at extra cost to themselves).
To perform this analysis we rule out fairness concerns by the part of consumers with respect to firms and vice-versa. This allows us to focus on the impact of fairness concerns among firms on collusive outcomes. The assumption that firms have fairness concerns and behave reciprocally towards their rivals finds support on experimental evidence where subjects play the role of firms.
In Lehman (2001) , individuals placed in the role of a manager were asked to report satisfaction with various combinations of sales figures for their own firm, as well as for a competing firm. Attention to fairness was found to be a significant factor. Huck et al. (2001) show that a Stackelberg leader finds it hard to exploit that advantage in experimental markets. The reason is that the Stackelberg follower acts more aggressively than predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium of these market games. In fact, followers punish the leader by supplying a higher quantity than their most profitable response to the leader's quantity. This behavior is in line with the observed negative reciprocity of responders in the ultimatum game when the proposer tries to exploit his first-mover advantage.
Armstrong and Huck (2010) argue that sometimes managers are motivated in part by personal animosity-or respect-towards a rival. Thus, firms might punish rivals who behave "unfairly" towards them. For example, firms might sometimes care when their rivals obtain an "unfair" share of industry profits, for instance by cheating on a collusive agreement.
To model reciprocity we follow Segal and Sobel (2007) and assume that players in a strategic environment have preferences not only over the outcomes but also the strategies. A player's utility is additively separable in monetary and fairness payoffs. Monetary payoffs are revenues minus costs and fairness payoffs are a weighted average of the rivals' monetary payoffs where the weights depend on how the rivals' choices are expected to differ from the fair ones. If a player expects a rival to play a kind (mean) strategy, then he places a positive (negative) weight on that rival's monetary payoff. If a player expects a rival to play a fair strategy then he places zero weight on that rivals' monetary payoff. We start by showing that reciprocity can lead to more or less competitive outcomes under static price competition. If players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most the smallest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested players, then the equilibrium attained is a positive reciprocity state. In this case reciprocity leads to a less competitive outcome since equilibrium prices are higher with reciprocators than with self-interested players. This happens because in a positive reciprocity state, reciprocators want to reward the rivals for having set prices higher than the fair ones. In contrast, if players believe that the fair prices of the rivals are at least the largest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested players, then the equilibrium attained is a negative reciprocity state. In this case reciprocity leads to a more competitive outcome since equilibrium prices are lower with reciprocators than with self-interested players. This happens because in a negative reciprocity state, reciprocators want to punish the rivals for having set prices lower than the fair ones.
In a standard setting, collusion can be sustained as an equilibrium by selfinterested players if they interact infinitely often and are sufficiently patient. A player is said to be patient if his discount factor is sufficiently close to one. In order to determine whether collusion is or is not facilitated by reciprocity we compare the minimal discount factor that allows for collusion in the case with reciprocity and in the standard case.
The main result of the paper shows that reciprocity facilitates collusion when players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most the collusive prices and at least the largest equilibrium prices of the static game with self-interested players. The intuition as follows.
If players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most the collusive prices, then collusion becomes a positive reciprocity state. In this case players' monetary payoffs from collusion are the same as the ones obtained in the game with self-interested players but in addition there are fairness payoff gains since players think that their rivals are being kind. This effect makes collusion more attractive to reciprocal players. Additionally, if players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at least the largest equilibrium prices of the static game with self-interested players, then Nash reversion becomes a negative reciprocity state. This implies that the punishment imposed after cheating occurs is more severe when players are reciprocal. This effect also makes collusion more attractive to reciprocal players. However, the short-run benefit to deviating is larger with reciprocal players because it includes the payoff a player derives from being treated kindly by the rivals (the rivals are playing their collusive prices). This effect makes collusion less attractive to reciprocal players. The assumption that monetary payoffs are large by comparison with fairness payoffs implies that the increase in collusive payoff is of first-order whereas the increase in the short-run benefit to deviating is of second-order.
We show that our main result also holds under quantity competition. In this case, reciprocity facilitates collusion when players think that the fair output of the rivals is at least the collusive output and at most the equilibrium output of the rivals in static game with self-interested players.
The analysis is mainly conducted assuming that players play Nash reversion punishments. In the appendix we extend the analysis to the case where players can play any credible punishment using penal codes à la Abreu (1988) .
Our paper is an additional contribution to the literature on the factors that help or hinder collusion. It is now well known that concentration, barriers to entry, cross-ownership, symmetry and multi-market contracts facilitate collusionsee Feuerstein (2005) . We find that reciprocity by the part of firms can facilitate collusion.
The main policy implication of our paper is that fairness concerns by firms with reciprocal managers can have adverse welfare consequences for consumers. In contrast, Rabin (1993) and Rotemberg (forthcoming) find that fairness concerns by the part of consumers can increase consumer welfare. Thus, social preferences in imperfectly competitive markets might lead to different outcomes depending on who has such preferences (producers or consumers) and what is the comparison group.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets-up the model. Section 3 analyzes the impact that fairness and reciprocity have on incentives for collusion when action choices are strategic complements. Section 4 considers the case of strategic substitutes. Section 5 discusses the findings. Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendix A contains the proofs of all results in the main text. Appendix B states and proves results when players use optimal punishments.
Set-up
The existing theories of social preferences can be classified into three broad categories. The first one is the distributional preference approach where social preferences only depend on the distribution of material payoffs. This includes Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) . These models are highly tractable and capture a wide range of phenomena but fail to explain the fact that preferences depend on more than outcomes, namely, intentions also matter.
The second category consists of intention-based models and includes Rabin (1993) , Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) , and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) , among others. These models assume that reciprocity depends on overall strategies and beliefs (and beliefs about beliefs) building on Geanakoplos et al. (1989) theory of psychological games. In Rabin (1993) utility is additively separable in monetary and fairness payoffs and the weight a player places on rivals' monetary payoffs depends on his perception of the rivals' intentions, which are evaluated using (i) beliefs about the rivals' strategy choices, and (ii) beliefs about the rivals' beliefs about his strategy. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive form games where players update beliefs about intentions as the game unfolds and make a choice accordingly. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) model reciprocity in incomplete information games. Intentionbased models have two major weaknesses: they use specific functional forms and are highly intractable.
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The third category explores the axiomatic foundations that generate utility functions that display social preferences. Nielson (2006) proposes a preference axiom which leads to a foundation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequity aversion model. Segal and Sobel (2007) provide an axiomatic foundation for interdependent preferences that can reflect reciprocity, inequity aversion, altruism as well as spitefulness. The key innovation of their approach is that, in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a strategic environment also have preferences over strategy profiles. This allows one to study situations where a player's preference is affected by the behavior of other players.
Their representation theorem shows that the payoff function of a player with such preferences is of the form
where σ i is the strategy of player i, σ * is how the game is expected to be played, u i is the utility from outcomes of player i, u j is the utility from outcomes of player j = i, and w ij (σ * ) is a coefficient that measures the weight player i gives to player j's utility, which is a function of the entire strategy profile. Positive values of the coefficient mean that player i is willing to sacrifice his utility from outcomes in order to increase the payoff of player j. Negative values mean that player i is willing to sacrifice his utility from outcomes in order to lower player j's payoff. Since the coefficient depends on the strategy chosen by player j, there is scope to model reciprocity. 2 We apply Segal and Sobel's (2007) approach to a dynamic game where n players, n > 2, play the same stage game over an infinite horizon t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The repeated game monetary payoff of player i of choosing strategy
..) when rivals play strategies s −i is given by
where π i (a (2005) points out some of the drawbacks of the distributional-preferences and intention-based approaches to reciprocity.
2 The underlying preferences in (1) are defined over outcomes. If an outcome specifies a material payoff to each player, then it is permissible for u i to depend on other players' material payoffs. Thus, this approach also generalizes the inequity aversion approach. the future at rate δ ∈ (0, 1) . To model reciprocity we assume that the weight player i places on player j's repeated game monetary payoff depends only on player j's strategy and on player i's perception of what is the fair strategy of player j, s f ij . We also assume throughout that players' preferences as well as their exogenous perceptions of the fair strategies of the rivals are common knowledge. The repeated game payoff of reciprocal player i of choosing strategy
where α > 0 is a normalization. The central behavioral feature of these preferences is the assumption that players care about the intentions of the rivals. If player i expects player j to treat him kindly, then w ij will be positive, and player i will wish to treat player j kindly. If player i expects player j to treat him badly, then w ij will be negative, and player i will wish to treat player j badly. If player i expects player j to be fair, then w ij will be zero, and there is no issue of reciprocity. Denote the dynamic game with reciprocal players by Γ r ∞ (u, s), where u = (u 1 , ..., u n ) and s = (s 1 , ...., s n ) and the dynamic game with self-interested players by Γ s ∞ (π, s), where π = (π 1 , ..., π n ). Players are able to sustain a collusive outcome when the payoff from collusion is no less than the payoff from deviation. To understand how fairness and reciprocity influence collusion we will compare the incentive compatibility condition of self-interested players in Γ s ∞ (π, s) to that of reciprocal players in Γ r ∞ (u, s) assuming that these two games are identical in all respects (monetary payoffs and the number of players) with the exception of players' preferences.
To perform this analysis we consider the cases where players' actions are strategic complements (e.g., price competition with products that are imperfect substitutes) and strategic substitutes (e.g., quantity competition with products that are perfect substitutes). We also consider two alternative modes of punishments after deviations: Nash reversion and optimal punishments.
The standard approach to study collusion in infinitely repeated games assumes that players use grim trigger strategies to punish any deviation from collusion, that is, following a deviation players switch to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game forever after. Thus, when self-interested player uses grim trigger punishments in Γ s ∞ (π, s), each player i will prefer to play his collusive strategy s
, is no less than the payoff from defection which consists of the one period gain from deviating
Solving for δ we obtain
The collusion strategy profile s c can be sustained by self-interested players who are patient enough such that δ s a c ≤ δ where δ s a c is the critical discount factor above which s c can be sustained by self-interested players. The same reasoning applies when players have reciprocal preferences. A reciprocal player i plays the collusive strategy s c i in Γ r ∞ (u, x) using a grim trigger strategy as long as the following condition holds
where u i denotes the stage game payoff of a reciprocal player, a function of the actions played and perceptions of the fair actions of the rivals. Solving for δ we obtain
When players have reciprocal preferences it follows that the collusive strategy profile s c can be sustained if players are patient enough such that δ r a c ≤ δ where δ r a c is the critical discount factor above which s c can be sustained by reciprocal players.
We will use (2) and (3) to characterize the impact that fairness and reciprocity have on collusion when players use grim trigger strategies. To perform this analysis we compare the critical discount factor above which the collusive strategy profile can be sustained when players are self-interested to the critical discount factor when players are reciprocal. We say that fairness and reciprocity facilitate collusion when the collusive strategy profile can be sustained at a lower critical discount factor when players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested. If the opposite happens we say that fairness and reciprocity make collusion harder.
Strategic Complements
We now specialize the model by assuming that players' actions are strategic complements. This assumption means that a player's incremental returns from increasing his own action are increasing in the rivals' actions. The canonical market game where players' actions are strategic complements is price competition with imperfect substitutes. We use this game to study the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion when players' actions are strategic complements.
In each stage player i chooses price, p i , and his payoff in that stage is
The monetary payoff is the difference between revenue and cost, that is,
is the cost of production, and
is the demand faced by player i. We assume that D i (·) is decreasing with p i , increasing with p −i , and C i (·) is increasing with D i (·). Furthermore, we assume that
The assumptions on w ij (p j , p f ij ) capture the fact that a reciprocal player cares about the intentions of the rivals. The first condition expresses positive or constructive reciprocity. If a player expects one of her rivals to charge a price higher than the fair price, then she puts a positive weight on that rival's profit and she is willing to sacrifice some of her profit to increase that rival's profit. The second condition says that if a player expects one of her rivals to choose the fair price, then she places no weight on that rival's profit. The third condition expresses negative or destructive reciprocity. If player a expects one of her rivals to undercut her perception of fair price, then she puts a negative weight on that rival's profit and she is willing to sacrifice some of her profit to reduce that rival's profit. Let
denote the set of maximizers of player i's stage game problem as a function of p i , p −i and p f −i . For finite quantities, the players will never choose an infinite price. Hence, the players' price choice set is compact set in R. We assume that u i is order upper semi-continuous in p i . The choice set being compact with this assumption guarantees that the set of maximizers
We also assume that u i has increasing differences in
This assumption implies that fairness payoffs are small by comparison with monetary payoffs which guarantees that prices are strategic complements.
3 Lemma 3 If the payoff function is differentiable, then u i having increasing differences in (p i , p −i ), is equivalent to the assumption that the cross partial derivatives of u i with respect to p i and p j for any player j, is non-negative, that is,
0, stated and proved formally in Appendix A, shows that these assumptions imply that Γ r (u, p) is a supermodular game. By Milgrom and Roberts (1990) we know that if Γ r (u, p) is a supermodular game, then there exist largest and smallest serially undominated strategies for each player, p i and p i . Moreover, the strategy profiles p and p are pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profiles. Thus, the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the stage game is guaranteed. Let us further assume that u i has decreasing differences in (p i , p f −i ). The following result shows how players' perceptions of the fair prices of the rivals influence the extremal equilibrium prices of this game.
Lemma 1: If Γ r (u, p) his a supermodular game and u i has decreasing differences in (p i , p f −i ) then, the smallest and the largest pure-strategy Nash equilibria of Γ r (u, p), i.e., p nr and p nr , are nonincreasing functions of
. Lemma 1 is a comparative statics result that characterizes the impact that players' perceptions of the fair prices of their rivals have on the Nash equilibrium prices of the stage game. This result says that the higher are players' perceptions of what the fair prices of the rivals should be, the lower will the equilibrium prices be. This happens because an increase in p f −i shifts the best reply of a reciprocal player i towards origin. In other words, the higher player i perceives the fair price for the other players to be, the more he would like to set a smaller price for any price of the other players. The critical assumption that drives this result is that u i has decreasing differences in (p i , p f −i ), that is, the marginal returns from increasing prices are decreasing with a player's perception of the fair prices of the rivals.
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Next we show how preferences for fairness and reciprocity change the outcome of static price competition. To do that we compare the Nash equilibria of the stage game with self-interested players to that of the stage game with reciprocal players. The findings are summarized in Proposition 1. 
Note that if a player cares only about monetary payoffs and if the payoff function is differentiable, then the increasing differences assumption boils down to
In the game with reciprocal players and differentiable payoff functions, the assumption will be satisfied if
> 0 and α is sufficiently small. 4 If u i is differentiable this assumption is equivalent to
This result tells us how fairness and reciprocity change the nature of static price competition. Part (i) tells us that if reciprocal players believe that the fair prices of the rivals are at least the largest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested players, then prices set by reciprocators will be lower than those set by self-interested players. In this case, fairness and reciprocity lead to a more competitive outcome. In contrast, part (ii) tells us that if reciprocal players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most the smallest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested players, then prices set by reciprocators will be higher than those set by self-interested players. In this case, fairness and reciprocity lead to a less competitive outcome.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. When reciprocal players believe that the fair prices of the rivals are at least the largest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested players, the smallest and the largest Nash equilibria of the game with reciprocal players are negative reciprocity states: reciprocal players expect their rivals to set unfair prices. This implies that reciprocal players wish to punish their rivals. They do it by setting a price lower than the price a self-interested player would set. The lower equilibrium prices reduce players' monetary payoffs and in addition lead to payoff losses due to the unkind behavior of the rivals. In contrast, when reciprocal players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most the smallest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested players, the smallest and the largest Nash equilibria of the game with reciprocal players are positive reciprocity states: reciprocal players expect their rivals to set kind prices. This implies that reciprocal players wish to reward their rivals. They do it by setting a higher price than the price a self-interested player would set. The higher equilibrium prices increase players' monetary payoffs and in addition lead to payoff gains due to the kind behavior of the rivals.
We now turn our attention to how fairness and reciprocity change the nature of dynamic price competition. The repeated game payoff of strategy
..) when rivals play strategies p −i is given by
When players use stationary strategies the repeated game payoff becomes
For the dynamic game with self-interested players, Γ s ∞ (π, p), we know from Friedman (1971) that for a sufficiently high discount factor, there is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ s ∞ (π, p) at a collusive price p c with payoff π(p c ) where π(p c ) is any payoff which gives every player strictly more than the payoff of the largest Nash equilibrium of This result states that given the fair prices profile, p f , for any p c such that the players' payoffs at the collusive prices are higher than their payoffs at the largest Nash equilibrium of the stage game, collusion can be sustained by reciprocal players at the strategy profile p c . From now on we assume that Nash punishments in Γ r ∞ (u, p) and in Γ s ∞ (π, p) are either at the smallest or largest pure strategy Nash equilibria of Γ r (u, p) and Γ s (π, p), respectively. Our next result shows that reciprocity facilitates collusion when there is price competition, marginal costs are constant, and players think that fair prices of the rivals are at least the largest Nash prices of the stage game with self-interested players and at most the collusive prices.
for all i and j = i. Then the critical (minimum) discount factor needed to sustain collusion at p c is lower in
The intuition for this result is as follows. If players think that the fair prices of the rivals are less than the collusive prices, then collusion becomes a positive reciprocity state. In this case players' monetary payoffs from collusion are the same as the ones obtained in the game with self-interested players but in addition there are fairness payoff gains since players think that their rivals are being kind. This effect makes collusion more attractive when players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested.
Additionally, if players think that the fair prices of the rivals are greater than the largest Nash equilibrium prices of the stage game with self-interested players, then Nash reversion becomes a negative reciprocity state. This implies that the punishment imposed after cheating occurs is more severe when players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested. This happens because monetary payoffs are lower than the payoffs of self-interested players and in addition there are fairness payoff loses since players think that the rivals are being unkind. This effect also makes collusion more attractive when players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested.
Clearly, these two effects make collusion more attractive to reciprocal players than to self-interested ones. However, the unilateral single period deviation payoff is higher with reciprocal players than with self-interested ones. This happens because the unilateral single period deviation payoff of a reciprocal player also includes the benefit that player derives from being treated kindly by the rivals (the rivals are playing their collusive prices). This effect of fairness and reciprocity makes collusion less attractive to reciprocal players than to selfinterested ones. The assumption that monetary payoffs are large by comparison with fairness payoffs implies that the increase in collusive payoff is of first-order whereas the increase in the unilateral single period deviation payoff is of secondorder.
Strategic Substitutes
We now show that fairness and reciprocity facilitate collusion in dynamic quantitysetting games with grim trigger punishments. Thus, when players are reciprocal, collusive action profiles are easier to sustain not only when players' actions are strategic complements but also when they are strategic substitutes.
When players' actions are strategic substitutes a player's incremental returns from increasing his own action are decreasing in the rivals' actions. The canonical market game where players' actions are strategic substitutes is quantity competition with products that are perfect substitutes. We use this game to study the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion when players' actions are strategic substitutes.
Assume that in each period player i chooses quantity, q i , and his payoff in that period is given by
is the fairness payoff, with α > 0. Player i's monetary payoff, π i (q i , q −i ), is the difference between revenue and cost, that is,
is the cost of production, and P (Q) is the inverse market demand with Q = q i . We assume that P (Q) is strictly positive on some bounded interval (0,Q) with P (Q) = 0 for Q ≥Q. We also assume that P (Q) is twice continuously differentiable with P ′ (Q) < 0 (in the interval for which P (Q) > 0). Players' costs of production are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with C ′ i (q i ) ≥ 0. It is also assumed that the decreasing marginal revenue property holds, that is, P ′ (Q) + P ′′ (Q) q i ≤ 0, and
Furthermore, we assume that the weight that player i places on the rivals' aggregate monetary payoffs depends on player i's perception of the fair aggregate output of the rivals, Q f −i , and on the actual aggregate output of the rivals such that
where
) is assumed to be differentiable in both arguments with ∂w i /∂Q −i < 0 and ∂w i /∂Q F −i > 0. The first condition in (6) expresses positive reciprocity. If a player expects her rivals to produce less than her perception of fair output, then she is willing to sacrifice some of her profit to increase the rivals' profits. The third condition in (6) expresses negative reciprocity. If a player expects her rivals to produce more than her perception of fair output, then she is willing to sacrifice some of her profit to reduce the rivals' profits.
Finally, we assume that monetary payoffs are large by comparison with fairness payoffs otherwise best replies of reciprocal players in a static Cournot oligopoly might no longer have a negative slope across all quantities.
Proposition 3: If Γ r (u, p) and Γ s (π, p) satisfy the conditions stated and
shows that fairness and reciprocity also facilitate collusion when players' choices are strategic substitutes. It says that if players think that the fair output of the rivals is at least the collusive output and at most the equilibrium output of the rivals in static game with self-interested players, then it is easier to sustain collusion when players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested.
The intuition is similar to that of Proposition 2. If reciprocal players think that the fair output of their rivals is greater than their collusive output, then playing the collusive output is more attractive in the dynamic quantity-setting game with reciprocal players than in the game with self-interested players. This happens because the collusive monetary payoffs are the same as the ones obtained in the game with self-interested players but in addition there are payoff gains from positive reciprocity since reciprocal players think that their rivals are being kind.
Additionally, if reciprocal players perceive that the fair output of their rivals is smaller than the equilibrium output of the rivals in static game with selfinterested players, then the punishment imposed after cheating occurs becomes more severe with reciprocal players than with self-interested players. This happens because, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game with reciprocal players becomes a negative reciprocity state. This is bad for players since it reduces monetary payoffs (by comparison with the monetary payoffs of self-interested players) and leads to payoff loses from negative reciprocity since reciprocal players think that the rivals are being mean.
In contrast, the single period deviation payoff in the game with reciprocal players is larger than the single period deviation payoff in the game with selfinterested players. This happens because the unilateral single period deviation payoff of a reciprocal player also includes the benefit that player derives from being treated kindly by the rivals (the rivals are playing their collusive outputs). However, this effect is of second-order since monetary payoffs are large by comparison with fairness payoffs.
Discussion
Our main results hold provided certain conditions are met. For example, we rule out fairness concerns by the part of consumers. This assumption was made on methodological grounds, to better isolate the effect of fairness and reciprocity among firms on collusive outcomes.
We also rule out that firms have fairness considerations with respect to consumers. Contrary to this assumption, Engel (2007) reports that when subjects know that they are playing against human buyers (instead of simulated demand), collusion rates decrease substantially. This might undermine the effects predicted by the model.
The assumption that Nash punishments are either at the smallest or largest pure strategy Nash equilibria is essentially a technical condition. This condition is necessary when the stage game has multiple equilibria since in a supermodular game we can state unambiguous comparative static results for the largest and the smallest Nash equilibria but not for other Nash equilibria.
So far the paper has indicated that fairness and reciprocity facilitate collusion when players use Nash reversion to punish deviations. However, Abreu's (1988) theory of optimal punishments can be an alternative framework of analysis.
The existence of penal code punishments gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome to be a subgame perfect equilibrium. On the contrary, Nash reversion punishments give only sufficient conditions. This is a problem since sufficient conditions do not prevent the existence of a harsher punishment in the self-interested case, which is not a Nash reversion punishment, such that the target payoff is a subgame perfect equilibrium for a smaller discount factor in the self-interested case than in the reciprocity case.
We have chosen to conduct the main analysis under Nash reversion punishments because simple strategies are more appealing since it is not very realistic that economic agents play complex strategies. Nevertheless, we show in Appendix B that our findings also extends to the optimal punishments framework (we only analyze the dynamic price-setting market game since the quantity-setting case is similar).
The intuition behind this result is as follows. First, the benefit of deviating today (the unilateral single period deviation payoff minus the collusive payoff) when players use optimal punishments is the same as when they use grim trigger punishments. We already know from Proposition 2 that if monetary payoffs are large by comparison with fairness payoffs, then the increase in the collusive payoff due to fairness considerations is of first-order whereas the increase in the unilateral single period deviation payoff is of second-order. Thus, the benefit of deviating is smaller for reciprocators than for self-interested players no matter if players use optimal punishments or grim trigger punishments.
Second, if reciprocal players think that the fair prices are smaller than the collusive prices, then the prices set on the initial path are perceived as kind behavior by the other players and lead to positive fairness payoffs. Therefore, when the prices of the initial path are set, the payoffs for reciprocal players are higher than those for self-interested players. Third, it is well known that punishments are more severe when players use optimal punishments than when they use Nash reversion strategies. If reciprocal players think that the fair prices of the rivals are greater than the largest Nash prices of the stage game with self-interested players, then seeing the rivals setting punishment prices lower than Nash prices will be perceived as nastier behavior than seeing the rivals setting Nash prices. Therefore, reciprocal players will set lower prices than self-interested players during the punishment phase under optimal punishments.
The second and the third effects imply that the cost of deviating (the collusive payoff minus the payoff of entering a punishment stage) is larger for reciprocal players than for self-interested players when players use optimal punishments.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on how fairness and reciprocity might affect market outcomes. Most of this literature has focused on the impact of fairness concerns by consumers on welfare. Here we take a complementary approach and focus instead on the role of fairness concerns among firms on collusive behavior.
Our main departure from the standard model of firm behavior is the assumption that managers in firms are motivated in part by personal animosity-or respect-towards a rival. Hence, firms might punish rivals who behave "unfairly" towards them and reward rivals who behave "fairly."
We find that fairness and reciprocity among firms can facilitate collusive behavior. We show that this result is valid not only when players' choices are strategic complements but also when they are strategic substitutes. The result also holds no matter if players use grim trigger punishments or optimal punishments. Thus, fairness concerns among producers with reciprocal preferences who interact repeatedly can have adverse welfare consequences for consumers.
periods. Formally, at t = 1, σ i (1) ∈ P i and for t = 2, 3, ..., σ i (t) : P t−1 → P i . Player i's strategy set is denoted Σ i , and the set of strategy profiles is denoted
A path (or punishment), P , is a stream of action profiles {p(t)} ∞ t=1 and let Ω ≡ P ∞ be the set of punishments. Any strategy profile σ ∈ Σ generates a path denoted P (σ) = {p(σ)(t)} ∞ t=1 , and it is defined as follows:
Player i's payoff from path P ∈ Ω is given by v x i : Ω → R for x = {r, s} such that
where u i is given by (4) and (5). Player i's payoff function is given by v Abreu (1988) introduces the simple strategy profile, which is defined by (n + 1)-vector of paths ( P 0 , P 1 , ..., P n ) and a rule. The initial path is P 0 , and for each player i ∈ {1, ..., n}, P i is the punishment for player i. Any unilateral deviation of player i from the ongoing path is responded by imposing P i . If more than one player deviate, the ongoing path continues to be followed and deviators will not be punished. Formally:
Let P i ∈ Ω, i = 0, 1, ..., n. The simple strategy profile σ( P 0 , P 1 , ..., P n ) specifies: (i) play P 0 until some player deviates unilaterally from P 0 ; (ii) for any j ∈ {1, ..., n}, play P j if the jth player deviates unilaterally from P i , i = 0, 1, ..., n, where P i is an ongoing previously specified path; continue with P i if no deviations occur or if two or more players deviate simultaneously.
A simple strategy σ( P 0 , P 1 , ..., P n ) profile is perfect if and only if no oneshot deviation by any player j ∈ {1, ..., n} from P i , i = 0, 1, ..., n, yields player j a higher payoff, when all players conform with P j after the deviation. 5 Let Σ p denote the set of perfect equilibrium strategy profiles of Γ ∞ (δ). The perfect equilibrium paths Ω p = { P (σ)|σ ∈ Σ p }, and payoffs V = {v( P )| P ∈ Ω p }. We introduce three more definitions from Abreu (1988) before stating the existence result. An optimal penal code is an n-vector of the strategy profiles {σ 1 , ..., σ n } such that for all i,
Let σ i ( P 1 , ..., P n ) = σ( P i , P 1 , ..., P n ). The simple penal code ( P 1 , ..., P n ) is the n-vector of the strategy profiles σ 1 ( P 1 , ..., P n ), ..., σ n ( P 1 , ..., P n ). Finally, a simple penal code ( P 1 , ..., P n ) is an optimal simple penal code if it is an optimal penal code.
Lemma 3: If Σ p is non-empty, P is a compact topological space and given p f , u : P × p f → R n is continuous, then an optimal simple penal code exists.
Proof of Lemma 3:
The lemma follows from Abreu (1988) under the assumptions of u(.).
Q.E.D.
Similarly, an optimal simple penal code exists for a continuous payoff function π : P → R n . Let present discounted value of player i's payoffs from the period t + 1 to ∞ along the path P be 
Proof of Lemma 4: The lemma follows from Abreu (1988) .
The left-hand-side of inequalities (14) and (15) are the benefit of deviating today for reciprocators and self interested players, respectively. The right-handside is the cost of deviating. Observe that the prices in each period of the initial path can be considered as any collusive prices.
Since the existence of optimal simple penal code is guaranteed under the given assumptions, our final result shows that fairness and reciprocity facilitate collusion when players use optimal simple penal codes. 
Proof of Proposition 5:
The minimum critical discount factor will be obtained if the inequality (14) and (15) hold with equality respectively for reciprocators and self-interested players, otherwise the discount factor can be decreased by a small amount without violating the inequality. In Proposition 3, we proved the LHS of the equations being smaller for reciprocators, hence a smaller discount level is possible for the reciprocators. In addition, the following condition is immediate v r i ( P 0 ; t + 1) ≥ v s i ( P 0 ; t + 1)
